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BANK SECRECY: THE END OF AN ERA? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade legitimate businesses and organized crime 
have substantially increased their use of financial institutions• in 
order to circumvent various U.S. laws. 2 In 1969 the covert transfer 
of proceeds from narcotics trafficking, securities frauds, income tax 
evasion, S.E.E. margin violations and other illegal activities to se-
cret foreign bank accounts constituted a significant portion of the 
U.S. balance of trade deficit. 3 Congress responded to this problem 
by passing the Bank Secrecy Act of 19704 which has recently been 
upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court, 5 and is considering 
the United States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters.6 This Comment will examine the remedial effects 
of the Bank Secrecy Act and the Treaty by describing their ap-
proach to the problems inherent in the covert international transfer 
of funds, and by analyzing their impact on tax evasion, stock and 
securities frauds and organized crime. 
II. THE BANK SECRECY ACT 
With the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act and the accompany-
ing Title III of Public Law 91-508,7 Congress took the first step in 
1. Financial institutions include banks, brokerage houses, and companies and persons 
who engage in the currency business. 
2. 2 U.S. CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 4395 (1970). 
3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1970, at 38, col. 1. In 1969 the United States suffered a balance 
of payments deficit of seven billion dollars of which 3.2 billion were listed as errors and 
omissions. It was estimated that a major part of the latter total was due to criminal transfers 
of U.S. dollars into secret foreign bank accounts. 
4. Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. §1730d (1970), 12 U.S.C. §§1829b-31 (1970), 15 U.S.C. 
§78g (1970), 15 u.s.c. §1602 (1970), 15 u.s.c. §§1642-44 (1970), 15 u.s.c. §1681 (1970), 31 
U.S.C. §§ 1051-62 (1970), 31 U.S.C. §§ 1101-22 (1970). 
5. California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). For a synopsis of this 
case see 2 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 355 (1974). 
6. Treaty between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, 12 INT'L. LEG. MATS. 916 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Treaty). 
A copy is available from the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. The Treaty 
is expected to be approved by the Congress and has been ratified by the Swiss Parliament. 
The Treaty becomes effective 180 days after both nations ratify it. 
7. Bank Secrecy Act, 84 Stat. 1114, Pub. L. 91-508, was passed on October 26, 1970. It 
contains six titles. Titles I and II are known as "The Bank Secrecy Act;" Title III deals with 
the related problem of margin requirements and is an amendment to the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1934); Title IV deals with the effective date of the 
previous three titles by publication in the Federal Register; Title V consists of amendments 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 20
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss1/20
272 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:271 
closing a "loophole" provided by secret foreign bank accounts. 8 The 
first three Titles of Public Law 91-508 are intended to regulate five 
types of financial transactions: 9 (1) U.S. banks and other financial 
institutions are required to maintain records of financial transac-
tions and keep copies of checks pursuant to regulations issued by 
the Treasury Secretary; 10 (2) financial institutions are required to 
report on currency deposits and withdrawals; 11 (3) persons who ex-
port or import currency in individual amounts greater than $5,000 
are required to file reports; 12 (4) the Secretary of the Treasury may 
require citizens who deal with foreign financial agencies to keep 
records of their transactions; 13 and (5) the restrictions on purchasing 
securities on margin are expanded to include U.S. borrowers. 14 
A. Financial Institution Recordkeeping 
Both chapters of Title I deal with financial recordkeeping. 
Under Chapter 1, the Treasury Secretary may require banks insured 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (F.D.I.A.) 15 to know the iden-
to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (1970); Title VI consists of amendments to 
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). 
8. Hearings on S .678 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the 
Committee on Banking and Commerce, 91st Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions at 244-45 (1970) 
(hereinafter cited as Senate Subcommittee Hearings), Statement by Robert Morganthau: 
Information and evidence developed in recent years shows that secret foreign 
accounts are used to conceal tax frauds, securities fraud, and many other types of 
criminal conduct ranging from the smuggling of heroin to payoffs to government 
employees. But in addition to those specific substantive violations, the availability 
of the secret foreign account to those with the resources to use it has created a 
loophole in our laws and in law enforcement. A democratic society such as ours 
depends on voluntary compliance. A gap available to some tends to discourage com-
pliance on the part of the large majority otherwise willing to comply. Unless this 
loophole is closed, the honest business and professional man will be put to a great 
disadvantage and millions of other Americans will lose confidence that the laws of 
this country are being fairly and impartially enforced. We will not have fair and 
effective law enforcement in this country without a systematic and vigorous effort to 
bring all criminals including those who hold positions of responsibility and power in 
business and the financial world to the bar of justice. 
9. S. REP. No. 91-1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) (hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT 
No. 91-1139). 
10. Bank Secrecy Act, §101, 12 U.S.C. §§1829b-31 (1970), §§121-29, 12 U.S.C. §§1951-
59 (1970). By making the chapter an amendment to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the 
recordkeeping requirements will be enforced by the various Federal examiners and supervi-
sory agencies which enforce the F.D.l.A. 
11. Bank Secrecy Act, §§221-23, 31 U.S.C. §§1081-83 (1970). 
12. Bank Secrecy Act, §§231-35, 31 U.S.C. §§1101-05 (1970). 
13. Bank Secrecy Act, §§241-42, 31 U.S.C. §§1121-22 (1970). 
14. Bank Secrecy Act, §301(a), 15 U.S.C. §78g (1970). 
15. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§1811-31 (1970). 
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tity of each person authorized to make withdrawals, sign checks or 
act in any capacity regarding an account. 16 In addition, the Secre-
tary has the power to require that records be kept of any draft, check 
or other instrument presented for deposit or collection, 17 and he 
may, at his discretion, require the maintenance of additional re-
cords not specified in the Act. 18 Thus the Secretary is given wide 
latitude in determining what types of records are necessary to en-
sure that the congressional intent19 is fulfilled. 
The recording requirements delineated in Chapter 1 are ex-
tended to all other financial institutions in Chapter 2.20 The Secre-
tary's authority to require recordkeeping also applies to any person, 
issuing or receiving checks or money orders in business, 21 transfer-
ring funds or credits domestically, 22 dealing in currencies or operat-
ing a currency exchange, 23 operating a credit card system24 or en-
gaging in any other similar activity specified by the Secretary.25 
Thus, almost every conceivable category of financial institution is 
within the Secretary's domain. 
The Bank Secrecy Act also provides sanctions to be applied 
when its provisions are violated. The Treasury Secretary is empow-
ered to seek injunctive relief, or to sue for civil or criminal penal-
ties.26 Pursuant to the power vested in him by the Act, the Treasury 
Secretary has issued regulations requiring every bank27 and broker 
or dealer in stocks and securities28 to secure, within 45 days from the 
date an account is opened, the taxpayer identification number of 
the individual opening the account. In the case of an account 
opened by one or more individuals, the financial institution must 
obtain the social security number of every individual having a finan-
cial interest in the account. 29 The regulations do provide, however, 
16. Bank Secrecy Act, §lOl(c), 12 U.S.C. §1829b(c) (1970). 
17. Bank Secrecy Act, §lOl(d), 12 U.S.C. §1829b(d) (1970). 
18. Bank Secrecy Act, §lOl(f), 12 U.S .C. §1829b(f) (1970). 
19. Bank Secrecy Act, §lOl(b), 12 U.S.C. §1829b(b) (1970). 
20. Bank Secrecy Act, §123(a), 12 U.S.C. §1953a (1970). 
21. Bank Secrecy Act, §123(b)(l), 12 U.S .C. §1953(b)(l) (1970). 
22. Bank Secrecy Act, §123(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. §1953(b)(2) (1970). 
23. Bank Secrecy Act, §123(b)(3), 12 U.S.C. §1953(b)(3) (1970). 
24. Bank Secrecy Act, §123(b)(4), 12 U.S.C. §1953(b)(4) (1970). 
25. Bank Secrecy Act, §123(b)(5), 12 U.S.C. §1953(b)(5) (1970). 
26. Bank Secrecy Act, §§124-27, 12 U.S.C. §§1954-57 (1970). 
27. 21 C.F.R. §103.11 (1974). 
28. 31 C.F.R. §103.11 (1974). 
29. 31 C.F.R. §103.11 (1974). The recording requirement for banks is found in §103.34(a), 
and the recording requirement for brokers and dealers in securities is found in §103.35(a). 
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for exceptions in certain instances. 30 
Banks and brokers and dealers in securities are also required to 
microfilm, copy or reproduce and maintain copies of each document 
granting signature authority over any deposit or share account. 31 In 
addition, all banks must keep records of all statements and of each 
check, draft or money order drawn on a bank when the amount is 
greater than $100 and the account averages less than 100 checks per 
month. 32 The Secretary has apparently decided that checks of less 
than $100 pose no threat to the bank secrecy laws and that accounts 
with over 100 monthly checks are ordinary business accounts. 33 
Banks must also keep records of all debits exceeding $100 to a cus-
tomer's account, 34 and moreover, banks are required to maintain 
records sufficient to reconstruct a demand account.35 Financial 
institutions36 must maintain separate records of each transfer 
greater than $10,000 either into the United States from a foreign 
nation, or out of the United States. 
The regulations accomplish two things: the identities of the 
account holders and other persons authorized to effect transactions 
in an account are now required to be recorded, and copies of the 
transactions are available if the need for them should arise. Access 
to these records, however, can only be obtained through a sub-
30. Among the exemptions the Secretary has granted are employees of a Maine bank 
who for 20 years have taken currency and checks in excess of $5,000 across the Canadian 
border several times a month, and a company which transports sealed packages containing 
money and valuables under contract for banks, brokerage houses, and securities dealers. For 
a more complete list see the exemptions following 31 C.F.R. §103.51 (1970). 
31. 31 C.F.R. §103.24(b)(l) (1970), for banks; 31 C.F.R. §103.35(b)(l) (1970), for brokers 
and dealers in securities. 
32. 31 C.F.R. §103.34(b)(3) (1970). 
33. Business accounts are subject to audit by the Internal Revenue Service - a practice 
which tends to discourage illegal transactions. 
34. 31 C.F.R. §103.34(b)(4) (1970). 
35. 31 C.F.R. §103.34(b)(10) (1970). 
36. 31 C.F.R. §103.ll(a) (1970) defines financial institution as: 
Each agency, branch, or office within the United States of any person doing business 
in one or more of the capacities listed below: 
(1) A bank (except bank credit card systems); 
(2) A broker or dealer in securities; 
(3) A person who engages as a business in dealing in or exchanging currency as, 
for example, a dealer in foreign exchange or a person engaged primarily in the cashing 
of checks; 
(4) A person who engages as a business in the issuing, selling, or redeeming of 
travelers' checks, money orders, or similar instruments, except one who does so as a 
selling agent exclusively or as an incidental part of another business; 
(5) A licensed transmitter of funds; or other person engaged in the business of 
transmitting funds abroad for others. 
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poena.37 While the regulations will encumber financial institutions 
with a great amount of paperwork, the need for these types of re-
cords outweighs the minimal cost and burden of keeping them.38 
The result is that any transaction which is conducted through a 
bank, and other significant transactions which are conducted 
through financial institutions, will be recorded. It will no longer be 
possible for a person to escape the documentation of his transactions 
by selecting a bank which does not maintain records. 
B. Financial Institution Reporting 
Although Chapter 2 of Title II implements this prov1s10n, 
Chapter 1 must first be examined because it contains several key 
definitions and provisions which are used throughout the Title. A 
"person" is defined in the Act to include: "all natural persons, 
partnerships, trusts, estates, associations, corporations, and all ent-
ities cognizable as legal personalities."39 The Act defines "financial 
institution" in very broad terms, so that it includes everything from 
a bank to a pawnbroker. 40 The regulations, however, limited the 
term to include: banks, brokers or dealers in securities, currency 
exchanges, persons who engage in the regular business of transmit-
ting funds abroad and those who deal in issuing, selling, or redeem-
ing travelers' checks or money orders. 41 
Under Chapter 1 the Secretary is permitted to delegate his 
power to check compliance and he may, at his discretion, grant 
exemptions from the regulations. 42 Thus, the Secretary may exempt 
firms engaged in legitimate businesses. 43 The provision for civil and 
criminal penalties for noncompliance and the right of the Secretary 
to sue for injunctive relief are similar to those enumerated in Title 
37. 31 C.F.R. §103.51 (1970). 
38. S. REP. No. 91-1139, supra note 9, at 2-5. In 1970 the cost of microfilming checks 
ranged from 1/ 2 to 11/ 2 mills per check. Banks usually charge 10 cents per check. 
39. Bank Secrecy Act, §203(c), 31 U.S.C. §1052(c) (1970); 31 C.F.R. §103.11 (1974). 
40. Bank Secrecy Act, §203(e), 31 U.S.C. §1052(e) (1970). 
41. 31 C.F.R. §103.ll(a) (1974). The Secretary did not include the following in his 
definition of "financial institution," although the Bank Secrecy Act authorized him to in-
clude them: telegraph companies; travel agencies; loan or finance companies; pawnbrokers; 
dealers in precious metals, stones or jewels; insurance companies; and operators of credit card 
systems. 
42. Bank Secrecy Act, §205(a), 31 U.S.C. §1054(a) (1970); 31 C.F.R. §103.46 (1974). 
See also note 22 supra. 
43. The problem with the exemption section is that most businesses appear to be legiti-
mate at one time or another, even though some are not. Organized crime has been using the 
funds from foreign bank accounts to finance seemingly legitimate businesses. See note 163 
infra and accompanying text. 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 20
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss1/20
276 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:271 
l.44 Chapter 1 does, however, specify an additional criminal penalty 
when the violation is in the furtherance of another federal crime or 
part of a specified activity. 45 This additional sanction is significant 
because Title II requires that certain physical currency transac-
tions, not consummated within financial institutions, be reported to 
the Secretary. 46 The additional penalty is intended to serve as a 
deterrent against those who export funds in currency in order to 
escape the documentation of the transaction by banks and financial 
institutions. The Secretary has exercised his prerogative and issued 
regulations consistent with the maximum authority vested in him 
by the Act. 47 
Chapter 1 also contains an immunity provision which compels 
a witness to testify before a court, a grand jury, or an agency of the 
United States after he has been granted immunity from criminal 
prosecution.48 This immunity provision has not been incorporated 
into the regulations, however, so that any violator of the Act may 
not be compelled by the Act to testify. 49 This may be a significant 
omission by the Secretary, since violations of the Act will usually 
be part of an overall criminal scheme which directly involves violat-
ing the Act. 5° Finally, any information contained in the reports filed 
with the Secretary may be shared with other federal agencies inves-
tigating criminal, tax or other regulatory matters. 51 
Under Chapter 2 of Title TI, which deals with domestic transac-
tions, 52 the Secretary may require any financial institution to report 
any transaction in U.S. currency or other monetary instruments.53 
The report must be signed by both the domestic financial institu-
44. Bank Secrecy Act, §207, 31 U.S.C. §1056 (1970), for civil penalty; §208, 31 U.S.C. 
§1057 (1970), for injunctions; §209, 31 U.S.C. §1058 (1970), for criminal penalty. 
45. Bank Secrecy Act, §210, 31 U.S.C. §1059 (1970). 
46. The recording provisions are complied with by financial institutions; the reporting 
by the senders and carriers. Because of this difference, the Government apparently felt that 
no additional penalty was needed to act as a deterrent against sending the currency as a 
physical entity. 
47. This is one of the few times in the Bank Secrecy Act where he has done this. 
48. Bank Secrecy Act, §211, 31 U.S.C. §1060 (1970). The immunity is for any testimony 
and all information obtained as a result of the testimony. 
49. The immunity clause has not appeared in any of the regulations promulgated by the 
Secretary. 
50. "Omission" perhaps is too kind a word. Since most, if not all, of the violations of 
the reporting requirements will be as part of another crime, the "omission" by the Secretary 
prevents the Government from using this valuable tool. However, there are other immunity 
provisions, i.e. in the organized crime area, which can be used, but only for those crimes. 
51. Bank Secrecy Act, §212, 31 U.S.C. §1061 (1970); 31 C.F.R. §103.43 (1974) . 
52. Bank Secrecy Act, §221, 31 U.S.C. §1081 (1970). 
53. Bank Secrecy Act, §§221-22, 31 U.S.C. §§1081-82 (1970) . 
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ti on and one or more of the participants in the transaction. If a 
participant is acting as the agent for another individual, he must 
identify the real party in interest.54 The reports are to be filed with 
the Secretary or his designated institutions.55 
The Secretary's regulations require a report whenever a deposit, 
withdrawal, exchange of currency, or other payment or transfer 
greater than $10,000 occurs through a financial institution.56 The 
Secretary has exempted transactions involving Federal Reserve and 
Federal Home Loan Banks, in addition to transfers originated solely 
with or by financial institutions or foreign banks. 57 Thus, while these 
transactions will be recorded they will not be reported. Parties 
fearing only the reporting requirements could still effect transfers 
through these banks with small chance of incrimination.58 Further-
more, if a bank has a customer whose business normally requires 
deposits and withdrawals in excess of $10,000 and that customer has 
a normal depositor relationship with the bank, then the bank may, 
on its own initiative, not file reports with the Secretary .59 The regu-
lations do not define either "a business whose deposits or withdraw-
als normally require $10,000 transactions" or a "normal depositor 
relationship." Thus, a bank, believing this type of an account exists, 
may be allowed to avoid the reporting requirement, and transac-
tions which should have been reported will not be brought to the 
Secretary's attention. However, the bank will still have to record the 
transactions and these records would be available in the event of 
later criminal prosecutions. 60 
This provision is significant because it requires that large with-
drawals, deposits, or currency exchanges be reported to the Secre-
54. Bank Secrecy Act, §222, 31 U.S.C. §1082 (1970). 
55. Bank Secrecy Act, §223, 31 U.S.C. §1083 (1970). 
56. 31 C.F.R. §103.22(a) (1974). 
57. 31 C.F.R. §103.22(b) (1974). 
58. The parties' transactions in amounts of $5,000 are only recorded and not reported 
unless in excess $10,000. Furthermore, transactions of less than $5,000 are only subject to a 
financial institution's own recording procedures. 
59. 31 C.F.R. §103.22 (1974). 
60. The banks will keep records of the depositors and give these records to the Secretary 
upon request . The Supreme Court recently decided United States v. Biseglia, 93 U.S. 1245 
(1975), in which it ruled that the I.RS. could go into banks and ask for the records of large 
numbers of depositors. This gives the I.RS. the power to get records of depositors without 
knowing names and find out who has been avoiding taxes. This is similar to the Secretary 
getting reports of transactions, and allows the I.RS. to get records which the Secretary would 
have to subpoena. The I.RS. can get these groups of depositors' records without even naming 
the depositors individually. 
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tary, who may then investigate them if he deems it appropriate. 61 
In the case of smaller transactions and those which the banks have 
concluded are normal for an individual customer, the bank will still 
have to maintain the records required pursuant to Title I. 62 Thus 
"the legislation significantly strengthens the hand of the Secretary 
in keeping track of large currency deposits or withdrawals."63 
C. Individual Reporting 
Chapter 3 of Title II requires that a report be filed by any 
person who, acting as a principal, agent, or bailee, transports or 
causes to be transported, either into or out of the United States, a 
sum greater than $5,000.64 The report must state: the origin, destin-
ation, and route of the funds; the legal capacity of the filer with 
respect to the monetary instruments; and, in the event that the filer 
is not the legal or beneficial owner, nor the person in whose behalf 
the monetary instruments are being shipped, the report must spec-
ify either the sender or the recipient of the instruments. 65 In the 
event of noncompliance, the sender is subject to a $1,000 fine and 
the funds may be forfeited. 66 Enforcement procedures stipulate that 
a search warrant must precede a search. 67 
The regulations require that a report be filed by any person68 
who physically transports or mails a sum greater than $5,000. 69 This 
regulation applies to transfers into the United States from a foreign 
nation, and vice-versa. This provision does not apply, however, to 
transfers of funds through normal banking channels, i.e., when the 
funds themselves are not physically transferred.70 
It would be pointless for the Secretary to require financial insti-
tutions to maintain records and report certain transactions, while 
not taking measures to prevent the physical transfer of currency. 
This is especially true since many of the transfers might be made 
61. This differs from records which the Secretary can see only after obtaining a sub-
poena. The reports will alert him to suspicious transactions. 
62. See notes 16-38 supra and accompanying text. 
63. The reports allow the Secretary to keep track of all large transfers of funds through 
the banks. The record-keeping requirement prevents transfers from going unrecorded. 
64. Bank Secrecy Act, §231(a), 31 U.S.C. §1101(a) (1970). 
65. Bank Secrecy Act, §231(b), 31 U.S.C. §1101(b) (1970). 
66. Bank Secrecy Act, §232, 31 U.S.C. §1102 (1970). This is especially true since reports 
must be filed for transactions over $5,000, which is greater than the $1,000 fine. 
67. Bank Secrecy Act, §235, 31 U.S.C. §1105 (1970). 
68. 31 C.F.R. §103.11 (1974). 
69. 31 C.F.R. §103.23(a)-(b) (1974). 
70. 31 C.F.R. §103.23(c) (1974). 
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in order to avoid the recordkeeping and reporting of financial insti-
tutions. As physical transfers were not subject to documentation 
prior to the enactment of the Act, there developed an extensive 
courier system for transferring currency to foreign banks.71 The cur-
rency being transferred often comes from such illegal activities as 
gambling, loan sharking, income tax evasion, narcotics and prosti-
tution.72 
If the required reports are filed, there would be no advantage 
to transferring the funds by courier, since the reports would serve 
as records and notify the Secretary of the forthcoming transaction. 
If the transaction were handled through normal banking channels, 
reports would not be filed unless the amount exceeded $10,000. 
Furthermore, the additional civil penalty, which allows the 
Government to keep the illegally transferred funds, should act as a 
deterrent since the confiscated funds will be greater than $5,000. 
The effectiveness of this deterrent will be directly related, of course, 
to the Government's ability to prevent the illegal transfers. 
The reporting requirement is also important because when an 
illegal transfer is intercepted, the Government will have an addi-
tional ground on which to prosecute. 73 Presumably, those persons 
seeking to avoid the reporting requirement will be attempting to 
avoid incrimination for illegal conduct. This provision would seem, 
therefore, to afford the Government an opportunity to prosecute an 
offender for violation of more than one crime. This is important, 
because those who presently transfer funds illegally will probably 
continue to do so, and a criminal conviction can now be obtained 
merely by proving that a report had not been filed. 74 Any original 
crime, of which the illegal transfer of funds was probably just a part, 
need not be proved, in order to obtain a conviction under this Title. 
Although the immunity provision might have encouraged cour-
iers to testify, this incentive was not included in the Secretary's 
regulations. Therefore, the Government might possibly use plea 
71. S. REP. No. 91-1139, supra note 9, at 6. The couriers charge between two and five 
percent of the amount being carried. 
72. Id. 
73. The Government could prosecute for the crime itself and for the violation of the Bank 
Secrecy Act. For example, narcotics smugglers who do not report their cash transactions 
would be liable for the non-reporting under the Bank Secrecy Act in addition to the narcotics 
charges. 
74. The crime which precipitated the violation of the Bank Secrecy Act does not need 
to be proved to send the alleged criminal to jail; conviction of violation of the Bank Secrecy 
Act will suffice. 
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bargaining in an attempt to influence the couriers to implicate the 
other parties to the transaction. 
D. Individual Recordkeeping 
Under Chapter 4 of Title II the Secretary might require busi-
nesses directly or indirectly engaged in foreign transactions to main-
tain records of their transactions. The records must include the 
identities of the parties to the transaction, the legal capacities of 
the parties to the transaction, the identities of the real parties in 
interest if one of the parties to the transaction is not a principal and 
a description of the transaction.75 As was noted, the Secretary is 
empowered to exempt persons or groups from compliance with the 
provisions of this Chapter. 76 A subpoena is required to compel pro-
duction of their records.77 
The regulations require all persons7s to report, on their federal 
income tax return, any information regarding any financial interest, 
or any signature or other authority over a "bank, securities or other 
financial account in a foreign country."79 Moreover, the regulations 
mandate that an individual maintain separate records of all infor-
mation required on the tax return.so The records shall contain the 
number or other designation of each account, the name under which 
each account is maintained, the name and address of either the 
foreign bank or other person with whom the account is maintained 
and the type and maximum value of the account during the report-
ing period.st 
The effectiveness of this provision will be dependent, of course, 
upon the ability of the Government to prohibit the unreported 
transfer of funds greater than $5,000. If records of unreported trans-
fers can be obtained, however, the Government will be supplied 
with invaluable aid in following their activities.s2 
75. Bank Secrecy Act, §241(a), 31 U.S.C. §1121(a) (1970). 
76. Bank Secrecy Act, §206, 31 U.S.C . §1055 (1970). 
77. Bank Secrecy Act, §241(b), 31 U.S.C. §1121(b) (1970). 
78. 31 C.F.R. §103.11 (1974). 
79. 31 C.F.R. §103.24 (1974). 
80. 31 C.F.R. §103.32 (1974). 
81. 31 C.F.R. §103.32 (1974). 
82. S. REP. No. 91-1139, supra note 9, at 5. It will be difficult for the Government to 
enforce this part of the Act when consideration is given to the immense borders of the United 
States and the difficulty in preventing couriers from secretly crossing them. 
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E. Margin Requirements 
While Title III is not officially part of the Bank Secrecy Act, it 
was enacted as part of Public Law 91-508.83 It is necessary to exam-
ine Title III with the Act since it is intended to remedy some of the 
problems created by foreign bank secrecy. Title III, which amends 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,84 makes it illegal for any person 
to receive a loan or credit which violates the margin requirements 
applicable to domestic lenders.85 
Under the regulations it is a violation of the Securities Act of 
1934 for any borrower to receive more than the legally permissible 
margin. 86 The regulations stipulate that when the securities are used 
as the collateral the maximum margin which can be extended is 50 
percent of the current market price. Thus, the borrower must put 
up 50 percent of the purchase price. 87 The regulation prevents 
borrowers from circumventing margin requirements which pre-
viously applied only to lenders. 88 
Before Title III, American lenders had been disadvantaged 
when competing with foreign lenders. Foreign lenders, who are not 
subject to the close scrutiny which American lenders are, have con-
stantly over-extended the margin to their borrowers.89 Since borrow-
ers were not subject to the margin requirement law, they were not 
liable for any violation of the previous Act. The section of Title III 
which imposes civil and criminal penalties upon the borrower will 
have little effect unless it can be proved that the foreign borrower 
over-extended the permissible margin requirements. In cases where 
the bank secrecy laws of other nations prevent the U.S. from obtain-
ing the records of foreign accounts, Title III will prove ineffective. 
F. Summary 
The Bank Secrecy Act was enacted to curtail the covert transfer 
83. Title III is an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§78(g) (1970). 
84. 15 u.s.c. §78 (1970). 
85. Bank Secrecy Act, §301, 15 U.S.C. §78(g) (1970) . 
86. 12 C.F.R. §224.2(a) (1975). 
87. 12 C.F.R. §220.8 (1975). Supplement to SEC Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220.8 (1975). 
88. Since Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corporation, 303 F. Supp. 1354 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), when it was decided that the law only applied to lenders and not to borrow-
ers, borrowers have been able to violate margin requirements without criminal liability. 
89. Bank Secrecy Laws in foreign nations are generally such that financial institutions 
in those nations are not closely scrutinized. They can therefore violate U.S. margin require-
ments since activities are shielded by bank secrecy laws. 
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of illegally obtained funds. The prevalent practice of depositing 
covert funds in non-recordkeeping financial institutions, and with-
drawing those funds from foreign accounts protected by that na-
tion's bank secrecy laws, will be limited by strict enforcement of the 
Act. If, for example, a withdrawal is made in Curaca'o and the funds 
are deposited in New York, there will be a record in New York 
documenting this transfer. To avoid recordkeeping, the money will 
have to be surreptitiously transported out of the United States as a 
physical entity, not as a negotiable instrument. If the money is 
transported without first being reported, then the transfer is illegal, 
and if the currency is intercepted, separate grounds for criminal 
prosecution exist.90 If the physical transfer is reported, then there is 
no advantage of the physical transfer over a transaction through a 
recordkeeping financial institution. However, as has been pointed 
out, the Bank Secrecy Act in itself is not enough - cooperation from 
other nations is also needed. 
III. UNITED STATES-SWITZERLAND: TREATY ON 
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 
Switzerland's signing of the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters represents a departure from previous Swiss bank-
ing practice. 91 The Treaty's acceptance may have been augured by 
90. See note 73 supra. 
91. See Comment, Swiss Banking Secrecy, 5 CoLUM. J. ThANSNAT'L L. 128 (1966); Com-
ment, Secret Swiss Bank Accounts: Uses, Abuses and Attempts at Control, 39 FORD. L. REV. 
500 (1971); Friedich, The Anonymous Bank Account in Switzerland, 1962 J . Bus. L. (Eng.) 
15; Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret, 18 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 360 (1969). In order to fully 
understand the importance of the Treaty with Switzerland one must first understand Switzer-
land and its bank secrecy laws. The Swiss regard for the right of privacy in one's personal 
and financial affairs has its roots in the Middle Ages and has progressed to where that right 
is now protected by criminal statute. Furthermore, unlike most bank secrecy nations, the 
Swiss even apply the right of privacy against their own government. This right became 
codified during the 1930's when Nazi Germany attempted to investigate the assets held in 
Switzerland by Jewish people and other "enemies of the State" in Article 47(b) of the 
Banking Law: 
Anyone who in his capacity as an officer or an employee of a bank, or as an auditor 
or his employee, or as a member of the banking commission or as an officer or an 
employee of its bureau intentionally violates his duty to observe silence or his profes-
sional rule of secrecy or anyone who induces or attempts to induce a person to commit 
any such offense, shall be liable to a fine of 20,000 francs or imprisonment of up to six 
months or both. If the offender acted with negligence he shall be liable to a fine up to 
10,000 francs. 
However, what has earned Switzerland the title of leader in bank secrecy is due more to 
Switzerland's importance as a banking center than to any other factor. 
While the Swiss will give assistance in civil and criminal matters under the Hague 
13
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X v. The Federal Tax Administration, a rare example of Swiss 
defiance of their bank secrecy laws. 92 It seems clear, however, that 
the Treaty was motivated by the tremendous influx of illicit funds 
into Switzerland. 93 
Under the Treaty a reasonable suspicion that the elements of a 
particular offense have been committed is the only prerequisite for 
a request for assistance by the country where the crime has oc-
curred.94 This assistance may include the taking of depositions, loca-
tion of persons, service of judicial and administrative papers and 
production and authentication of documents.95 The Treaty does 
not extend to military or political offenses, cartel or anti-trust vio-
lations, and tax, custom duty, government monopoly or exchange 
Convention, the Swiss have reserved the right not to aid in matters of administrative law, 
and any investigation which would violate the Swiss ordre public. The Swiss consider income 
tax evasion an administrative matter and do not provide assistance in this area. Furthermore, 
Swiss banks will not provide assistance when the information is not compelled to be distrib-
uted under cantonal law. 
92. Under the Convention Between United States-Switzerland for the Avoidance of Dou-
ble Taxation with Respect to Taxes On Income, May 24, 1951, 2 UST 1753, information will 
be exchanged between the United States and Switzerland when a violation of the Convention 
has occurred. The Convention is limited to the very narrow area of the taxation of persons 
and businesses of one nation who do business in the other. 
In X v. The Federal Tax Administration, U.S. Tax cases (71-1, at 86566) 9435 (Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court, Dec. 23, 1970, Unofficial CCH translation), the veil of bank secrecy 
began to crack as the Swiss gave out information for the first time under the Convention. In 
this case the I.R.S. claimed that it had reason to suspect that X, an American citizen, had 
defrauded the U.S. tax authorities. An investigation by the Swiss Federal Tax Administration 
confirmed the l.R.S. suspicions. 
X unsuccessfully argued that since no action for tax fraud was pending against him in 
the United States the Swiss should not give out the information; the Court held "(i)t is 
essential only that there be a suspicion, sustained by the facts, that fraud or the like has been 
committed or such illegal act is planned." 71-1 at 85658. 
The second and major issue in the case was whether under Swiss law a bank must give 
out information concerning a possible tax fraud. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court decided 
that since the Convention was federal law, the American negotiators had reasonably assumed 
that the Convention would apply to tax fraud cases. This assumption was based upon the 
fact that the three major banking centers in Switzerland were located in cantons which had 
tax fraud laws. 
This decision altered over twenty years of Swiss policy without changing the basic princi-
ples of Swiss law. While the Swiss had always denied assistance in tax evasion cases under 
the Convention this case allowed aid in a tax fraud case after a reasonable suspicion had been 
shown. See also Note, Swiss Accounts, 38 BROOK. L. REv. 389 (1971). 
93. See Recent Treaties, 7 VAND. J . TRANSNAT'L 469 (1974); Note, Judicial Assistance-
Criminal Procedure, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 349 (1974); Comment, The Recent Swiss-American 
Treaty to Render Assistance in Criminal Law Enforcement: Panacea or Placebo?, 7 N.Y.U. 
J. INT'L L. & POL. 103 (1974). 
94. See Treaty, supra note 6, art. 1, §2. 
95. Id. art. 1, §4. 
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control violations.96 These exclusions (with the exception of military 
offenses) do not apply when organized crime is involved. 97 Through-
out the Treaty, such special treatment of organized crime strongly 
evidences both governments' concern with this problem. 
Assistance will be discretionary to the extent that the aiding 
state feels that its "sovereignty, security or similar essential inter-
ests" are prejudiced.98 If a request for assistance is made for the 
purpose of prosecuting a person who has been acquitted or convicted 
of substantially the same charge in the requested state, 99 assistance 
is discretionary as well, except in organized crime cases. 100 
Evidence will be furnished, and criminal investigations con-
ducted, pursuant to the normal practices of the state giving assis-
tance .101 Any testimony, documents, records or other articles of evi-
dence produced by the requested state may be used only in relation 
to the offense for which assistance was granted.1°2 An exception 
exists when the evidence is used to prosecute or investigate 
accomplices to the same crime for which assistance was granted, or 
when the investigation or trial is for another offense for which assis-
tance has been granted or concerns a member of organized crime. 103 
There is a special section on "organized crime" 104 which illus-
trates the two nations' concern with the increased power of organ-
ized crime. Another section of the Treaty allows assistance for any 
violation of the tax laws of the requesting state if an individual is 
96. Id. art. 2, § 1. 
97. Id. art. 2, §2. 
98. Id. art. 3. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. art. 4. 
102. Id. art. 5. 
103. Id. In the case that any of these exceptions apply, however, the requested State 
should first have the opportunity to have its views heard. 
104. Id. arts. 5-7. Article 6(3)a defines "organized criminal group" as: 
... an association or group of persons combined together for a substantial or 
indefinite period for the purposes of obtaining monetary or commercial gains or profits 
for itself or for others, wholly or in part by illegal means, and of protecting the illegal 
activities against criminal prosecution and which, in carrying out its purposes in a 
methodical and systematic manner: (a) at least in part of its activities commits or 
threatens to commit acts of violence or other acts which are likely to intimidate and 
are punishable in both States; and (b) either (1) strives to obtain influence in either 
politics or commerce, especially in political bodies or organizations, public administra-
tion, the judiciary, in commercial enterprises, employers' associations, or trade 
unions or other employees' associations; or (2) associates itself formally or informally 
with one or more similar associations or groups at least one of which engages in 
activities described under subparagraph b(l). 
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suspected of being in the "upper echelon" of an organized crime 
group or is an important person in such a group. 105 "Organized 
crime" and "upper echelon" are defined broadly, thereby allowing 
a wide degree of flexibility for both nations to fit persons into the 
definition. 106 
There is, however, a limitation on bank secrecy requests when 
the evidence, although permissible, does not concern a party di-
rectly connected with the offense. 107 In these cases the request will 
be complied with only when the investigation or prosecution is of a 
serious offense, the disclosure is important to the investigation 
or proceeding and the requesting nation has made reasonable 
attempts to obtain the evidence in other ways but has not been 
successful. 108 Under the Treaty there exists an interesting possibility 
for the prosecution of violators of the U.S. tax laws. Although a first 
reading of the Treaty seems to preclude the Swiss government's 
assistance in any tax matters unrelated to organized crime, a 
contrary interpretation is possible. 
Article II, section I(c)(5) of the Treaty, and Item 34 of the 
accompanying Schedule of Offenses for which compulsory assis-
tance is required, may provide an exception to the ban on informa-
tion in tax matters. Item 34 incorporates the previous 33 items, 
among which is listed the offense of fraud. The examples of fraud 
provided by Item 19, although not totally inclusive of the types of 
fraud covered by the Treaty, do not contain any examples of tax 
fraud. 109 Furthermore, in the case of tax fraud, to interpret Item 34 
as including the previous 33 items would render the Article 2 tax 
exclusion meaningless. 110 
The Swiss Treaty should prove beneficial in prosecuting viola-
105. Id. art. 6 §§2-3. See 68 DEP'T STATE BULL. 947 (1973). 
106. See note 101 supra. 
107. Id. art. 10, §2. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. Item 19 of the Schedule: 
Fraud, including: 
a. obtaining property, services, money or securities by false pretenses or by de-
frauding by means of deceit, falsehood or any fraudulent means; 
b. fraud against the requesting State, its states or cantons or municipalities 
thereof; 
c. fraud or breach of trusts committed by any person; 
d. use of mails or other means of communication with intent to defraud or deceive, 
as punishable under the laws of the requesting State. 
110. To interpret item 34 as always including the previous 33 items would make no sense 
since it is referred to in the Articles granting immunities from prosecution as one of the few 
offenses to which the immunity does not apply. 
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tors of the Bank Secrecy Act. The Treaty will make it possible to 
receive information on violations of the Act which put funds into 
Swiss bank accounts. 111 Whether or not this will prove to be a viable 
solution to all the problems which both the Act and the Treaty were 
enacted to solve is another matter. 
IV. THE NEED FOR THE CHANGES AND THEIR EFFECTS 
A. The Evasion of Taxes 
The former United States attorney for the Southern District of 
New York, Robert Morganthau, characterized the secret foreign 
bank account "as the largest single tax loophole permitted by Amer-
ican law. " 112 By using the secrecy of foreign accounts the tax evader 
has been able to successfully frustrate American tax laws. This 
practice is unfair since most Americans faithfully pay their taxes 
and it is generally the wealthy who are able to partake of this prac-
tice.113 Furthermore, although tax investigations and convictions 
have been one of the major devices in prosecuting leaders of organ-
ized crime, this, too, has been stymied by lack of recording require-
ments and the use of foreign bank secrecy laws abroad. 114 
One of the major problems which the Bank Secrecy Act and the 
Swiss Treaty tried to alleviate is income tax evasion. The Treaty 
will help only when organized crime is involved. 115 While tax infor-
mation will still be provided under the United States-Switzerland 
Double Taxation Convention, 116 this Convention's scope is limited 
and will only affect a small number of cases. 
The ways in which a taxpayer can avoid taxes through the use 
of secret bank accounts are limited only by his imagination. 117 It is 
possible, however, to group the methods of avoidance into three 
major categories: the transfer of funds out of the United States 
which were not reported as income, 118 the use of foreign bank 
111. See text of Section II. The reason for this is that it is a violation of criminal law to 
violate the Bank Secrecy Act. 
112. See note 2 supra at 4398 and note 8 supra. 
113. See note 8 supra. 
114. Note, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEXAS INT. L.F. 105, 108 (1970) (hereinafter 
cited as Secret Accounts). 
115. See note 105 supra. 
116. See note 92 supra. 
117. A taxpayer can have non-reported income which could have been earned legally 
or illegally sent directly to his secret foreign bank account, or can use the account to generate 
false deductions. 
118. See notes 121-125 infra and accompanying text. 
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accounts to generate false deductions on illegitimate business trans-
actions, 119 and the direct deposit of income-generating assets in for-
eign accounts. 120 
1. TRANSFER OF FUNDS 
Under the first method of tax avoidance, earnings and profits 
are illegally transferred out of the United States into secret foreign 
bank accounts and never declared as U.S. income. As was pre-
viously stated, under the Bank Secrecy Act, all such transactions 
will be recorded by the financial institutions and, if the transfer is 
large enough, it may be reported to the Treasury Secretary. If the 
funds are illegally transferred through a courier, the sending party 
will risk both forfeiture of the entire transfer and possible criminal 
prosecution if the courier is intercepted. 121 However, the Swiss 
Treaty will not help solve this problem unless either organized crime 
is involved 122 or the funds have been transferred in violation of the 
Bank Secrecy Act. 
An interesting situation arises when illegally earned money is 
transferred out of the United States. Under U.S. tax law all income 
must be reported. 123 Assuming, however, that the illegally obtained 
and transferred funds were not reported as income to the Federal 
Government, assistance may be requested from the Swiss govern-
ment, under the Treaty, on three different bases: the fraud theory; 
violation of the Bank Secrecy Act; and suspicion of criminal activity 
in obtaining the funds. 124 Assuming the U.S. Congress ratifies the 
Treaty, however, persons who desire the safety and refuge of the 
secret foreign bank account may merely move their accounts to 
another foreign nation which is more receptive to their needs. 125 
Thus, the success in stopping this type of income tax evasion rests 
squarely upon the Bank Secrecy Act until all nations of the world 
revise their bank secrecy laws. 
119. See notes 126-132 infra and accompanying text. 
120. See notes 133-138 infra and accompanying text. 
121. Bank Secrecy Act, §210, 31 U.S.C. §1059 (1970). 
122. Treaty, supra note 6, art. 6. 
123. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §61. 
124. If the money is illegally earned and smuggled out of the United States contrary to 
the Bank Secrecy Aet, the United States could ask the Swiss for information concerning the 
violation of the Act and the other crime and thus avoid the problem of not being aided in 
the tax request. 
125. Curacao, the Bahamas and Panama would be leading contenders for the money. 
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2. FALSE DEDUCTIONS 
A common example of the false deduction scheme occurred 
when a taxpayer claimed, as a bad debt deduction, 126 the failure of 
a foreign corporation to repay a loan, when in fact the corporation 
was owned by the taxpayer and organized for the express purpose 
of making the loan. The loan was simply a payment, by the taxpayer 
to himself, which was placed in a foreign bank account. 127 In another 
case a taxpayer claimed an interest deduction on a loan which he 
had taken out from a foreign corporation. The money went from one 
secret account to another, both of which were entirely under the 
taxpayer's control. 128 Other cases involve the non-reporting of stock 
transactions, capital gains and false deductions. 129 
Swiss banks have been very helpful to their depositors in 
setting up illegitimate transactions. The banks lend the depositors 
their own money so that the depositors will have an explanation for 
the source of their funds. 130 When the Internal Revenue Service 
questions the source of the funds, the recipient claims that it was a 
loan, and hence not taxable income. 131 
Both the false deduction and false source schemes involve in-
come tax fraud. The Swiss Treaty will only help if the fraud argu-
ment is accepted by the Swiss. 132 It is probable that the Treaty will 
not alleviate this type of tax evasion unless organized crime is in-
volved. The Bank Secrecy Act will not remedy the problem becaus~ 
the funds were not illegally transported out of the United States. 
There are two potential solutions to the tax evasion problem. 
The Swiss could interpret the Treaty broadly to cover income tax 
problems, or the Internal Revenue Service could disallow any such 
deduction unless the taxpayer permits investigation of the foreign 
accounts which gave rise to the deduction. The first of these solu-
126. The taxpayer would lend money to a corporation which he entirely owned. The 
corporation would then default on the loan and the taxpayer would get a bad debt deduction. 
The taxpayer would also get the money, since he owned the corporation, from the firm's secret 
foreign bank account. 
127. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 8, at 266. 
128. Id. See also 266-67. 
129. Id. See U.S. v. Campbell, 351 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907 
(1966) for capital gains example. 
130. See Secret Accounts, supra note 114, at 126. 
131. Since the source of the funds was a secret foreign bank account, the Internal 
Revenue Service would be unable to prove that the money "lent" to the taxpayer was earned 
by him and not reported as income. 
132. The Bank Secrecy Act will not have been violated since the money was not from 
the United States. 
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tions is improbable in light of the history of the Swiss bank secrecy 
laws and their regard of tax evasion as an administrative matter to 
which their restrictive bank secrecy laws often apply. The second 
solution appears to be the better alternative because it places the 
burden on the taxpayer to prove the legitimacy of the deduction. 
Even given a liberal Swiss interpretation of the Treaty, or an 
acceptance of the fraud theory, as long as banks in other nations 
function as safe repositories for these funds, the second solution will 
be necessary to remedy tax fraud. There is a clear need for a multi-
lateral treaty designed to establish uniform bank secrecy laws. 
3. INCOME SENT DIRECTLY 
Under the third method of tax avoidance, depositors transfer 
the title to assets, typically real estate or mortgages, to their Swiss 
banks in an effort to avoid taxation on the annual income and the 
eventual capital gain. 133 This method is particularly profitable be-
cause many of the countries which have secrecy laws either have no 
income tax or the tax rate is substantially lower than the U.S. 
rate. 134 In addition, citizens have established dummy trusts and 
corporations to serve as repositories for their incomes,135 and U.S. 
investors have evaded taxes by trading their profits through secret 
Swiss bank accounts. 136 
133. See Secret Accounts, supra note 114, at 112. 
134. Panama, Curacao, Lichtenstein and the Bahamas are notorious for having secret 
banking facilities. See also Hearings on Foreign Bank Secrecy and Bank Records on H.R. 
15073 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st Congress, 1st and 2d Sess. 
at 18-20 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Hearings #1); Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 
8, at 261. 
135. Hearings on the Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign Banking Procedures on the 
United Stg.tes Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th Congress, 2d 
Sess. at 14 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Hearings #2). Statement by Robert Morganthau at 
14: 
Salesmen earning commissions from U.S. manufacturers for sales overseas have 
sometimes worked out a slightly more complicated device, as exemplified in a recent 
indictment which our office obtained. These salesmen set up a dummy Lichtenstein 
trust with a Swiss bank account. A Lichtenstein lawyer who serves as the chief 
executive of hundreds of such trusts became the ostensible head of the foreign entity. 
The salesmen advised the U.S. manufacturers, and these included leading American 
manufacturers, that most of the selling would be done in the future by the Lichten-
stein corporation and directed that the major portion of the sales commissions earned 
should be sent to Lichtenstein rather than to the U.S. salesmen. This money was 
deposited by the Lichtenstein lawyer in the Swiss bank. In this manner, the U.S. 
taxpayers fraudulently evaded taxes on over $3 million unreported income in just 
over 3 years. 
136. Id. Again Morganthau pointed out: 
Numerous U.S. investors have undertaken to avoid profits by trading their profits 
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The Bank Secrecy Act will have no effect on this type of trans-
action if the money is earned abroad. If, however, the money is 
earned in the United States and is transferred to a foreign bank 
account under the guise of being earned by a foreign citizen, then 
the Act will apply, as the transfer of funds through the banking 
system was transacted under a false identity. 137 In these situations, 
the Swiss Treaty will be helpful once a reasonable suspicion of crim-
inal activity has been established. 
If the funds are declared as income by a Swiss account, trust 
or corporation, then the Double Taxation Convention will have been 
violated and following the X v. Federal Tax Administration138 doc-
trine the Swiss will aid the U.S. Government's investigation. Ob-
viously, if the fraud takes place within another nation's secret 
account, no cooperation can be expected. 
B. Stocks and Securities 
In 1966 Congress passed the Foreign Investment Tax Act139 
which was intended to encourage foreign investments. 140 Under the 
Foreign Investment Tax Act, a foreign corporation, whose sole activ-
through Swiss bank accounts. The investor need only open an account in Switzerland 
and cable or mail trading instructions. The bank maintains huge accounts with U.S. 
brokers and executes orders each day through these brokers on the appropriate U.S. 
stock exchange. The U.S. broker has no indication of the identity of the Swiss bank's 
client. 
This system is ideal for the investor seeking long-term growth, since the loss of 
a day cabling his order to Switzerland and back to New York will not be of great 
significance to him. 
Many New York brokers deal in such large volumes for Swiss banks that they 
maintain open telex lines or talk on the telephone several times a day. It has therefore 
been arranged for the trader to deal with a broker-sometimes using a code name 
-and give his order to buy or sell X security. The broker arranges immediately to 
receive such an order from Switzerland for an unknown customer of the Swiss bank 
and executes the order as if he had it from Switzerland for an unknown customer of 
the Swiss bank. The broker's only written confirmation will go to Switzerland but 
he can advise the trader by phone of the completed transaction. To facilitate the 
trading, the Swiss bank can main:tain the trader's account as a subaccount at the 
broker rather than as part of its general account. Thus, the broker might have one 
account labeled Bank X, subaccount 1, 2, 3, etc. He would still receive the ostensible 
orders covering these accounts from Switzerland and have no records identifying the 
true owner of the account. 
137. This is so because the beneficial owner of the money would not have been identified. 
The same will hold true if the funds are transported without the beneficial owner being 
identified. 
138. See note 92 supra. 
139. 26 u.s.c. §861(b) (1970). 
140. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 8, at 262. 
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ity in the United States is in the securities field, is not subject to 
U.S. taxation. While the act has stimulated foreign investment in 
the United States, the corporate investors are beyond the reach of 
the Securities Exchange Commission and other law enforcement 
agencies. 141 "As a result, in the long run . . . the practical reach of 
the law may be detrimental to American investors, to foreign inves-
tors in the American market and ultimately to the balance of pay-
ments itself." 142 
In effect, the Foreign Investment Tax Act made it more lucra-
tive for Americans to invest in corporate stocks and securities 
through secret foreign accounts. This has, in fact, become a preva-
lent practice. 143 In one case, margin requirements were violated 
when brokers handled a Swiss bank's account in which three regis-
tered representatives and a senior partner had purchased stock in 
violation of the margin requirements. 144 The same pattern was re-
peated in the HOMC0145 case where provisions of Regulation T were 
violated. 146 
The problem arises because foreign banks can buy securities for 
unnamed investors without disclosing the margin. American and 
foreign investors have purchased stock through foreign banks under 
overextended margin circumstances. The banks then purchase the 
securities through American brokerage houses and the illegal activ-
ity goes undetected. 
In addition to its regular deposit and credit activities, almost 
every Swiss bank may act as a broker and dealer in securities for 
its customers. 147 The banks maintain securities with American bro-
kerage houses under the bank's name, thereby making it impossible 
to ascertair. the owner of each security. 148 Because of this trading 
system the possibility of fraud is substantially increased. 149 
Title III of Public Law 91-508, in combination with the Swiss 
Treaty will help to alleviate this problem once a reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity is established. The problem is creating the 
reasonable suspicion. Once this has been accomplished, since the 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. See Hearings #1, supra note 134, at 19-23. 
144. Id. at 23. 
145. Id. at 24. See also Secret Swiss Bank Accounts, supra note 91, at 506. 
146. SEC Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220.4(b) (1975), SEC Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §220.8(a)(l) (1975). 
147. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 8, at 73-91. 
148. Hearings #2, supra note 135, at 6. 
149. Id.; Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 8, at 263. 
22
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 20
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss1/20
292 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:271 
American borrower has violated the margin requirements of Title 
III, the Swiss Treaty will allow the Swiss to aid the U.S. Govern-
ment. If the United States does approve the Treaty, however, the 
borrowers will probably avoid incrimination by taking their busi-
ness from Swiss accounts to other nations with bank secrecy laws. 
Swiss banks have also been used to perpetrate securities frauds 
on the American public. A classic example is the Gulf Coast 
Leaseholds150 case in which "four 'Lichtenstein trusts' holding Swiss 
bank accounts were instrumental in a scheme by American promo-
tors to sell 750,000 shares of unregistered over-the-counter stock to 
the American public at prices manipulated to over $16 a share." 151 
After the promoters had taken their profits the price dropped to 
under one dollar per share. Each of the trusts were American-owned 
with a Swiss lawyer acting as the titular head. Because of the Swiss 
bank secrecy law the identity of the trusts' principals and owners 
were concealed successfully .152 In addition, Swiss bank accounts 
have been used in the sales of stolen securities. 153 While in the latter 
two cases the Bank Secrecy Act is inapplicable, since fraud is in-
volved, the provisions of the Swiss Treaty will apply after a reasona-
ble suspicion of illegal activity has been established. 
Through the bank secrecy laws of other nations corporate insi-
ders have illegally traded stock without filing the required forms, 154 
stocks have been purchased in violation of the margin requirements, 
criminals enjoined from trading on the stock exchanges have done 
so and stolen and valueless securities have been traded. These prac-
tices have occurred in a market where foreign investment accounted 
150. United States v. Kelley, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 947 
(1966). 
151. Hearings #1, supra note 134, at 20. 
152. Id. See also Hearings #2, supra note 135, at 12, and see United States v. Hayutine, 
398 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968). In this case, known as the Allied 
Entertainment case, prohibitions against unregistered stock were circumvented when the 
stock was delivered to a Munich bank which in tum sold the stock to the American public 
through brokerage firms in which the bank had accounts. The insiders of the corporation had 
manipulated the stock to an artificially high price and then covered up their trail by deposit-
ing the fonds in the Frankfurt branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank. From there the funds 
were transferred to the swindlers' Swiss bank account in Munich. Thus insiders were able to 
circumvent U.S. laws requiring the filing of reports. 
153. See Secret Accounts, supra note 114, at 109. See also United States v. Blackwood, 
456 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1972), where six were indicted for selling stolen securities through a 
Swiss bank, and United States v. Phillip L. Bradford and Walter Fink, 62 Cr. 100 (1965), 
where $50,000 in stolen securities were exchanged for currency by a Swiss bank. See also 116 
CONG. REC. 16951 (1970). 
154. See note 152 supra. 
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for purchases of $12.5 billion and sales of $11 billion of common 
stock in 1969. 155 Moreover, many Americans involved in these 
schemes never had to leave the country in order to deal through the 
foreign banks and take advantage of existing secrecy laws. 
A Treaty with Switzerland is ineffectual as long as there are 
other foreign nations to which investors can tum. The U.S. Senate 
recommended a bill stipulating that all foreign investors identify 
any Americans for whom they are buying stocks. 156 This bill would 
have been helpful, except that shrewd investors desiring to circum-
vent the law would undoubtedly have the stock purchased by some-
one else. Rather, a bill is needed combining the Senate proposal 
with a requirement that all margins extended also be identified. 
Even if such a bill is passed, it will have little effect unless the 
foreign bank secrecy nations help the United States enforce it or all 
parties purchasing U.S. stocks sign waivers permitting the Govern-
ment to investigate their foreign bank accounts if a reasonable sus-
picion of illegal activity exists. 
C. Organized Crime 157 
Organized crime has been a primary beneficiary of foreign bank 
secrecy laws. Swiss accounts have become depositories for the pro-
ceeds of heroin158 and other narcotics transactions. 159 In addition, 
155. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 8, at 87, Statement by Hamar Budge, 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
156. S. REP. No. 91-1139, supra note 9, at 2. 
157. For a definition of "organized crime" see note 104 supra. 
158. 116 CONG . REC. 16956 (1970): 
The secret bank accounts are an integral part of the heroin trade. Money re-
ceived for the sale of heroin in the United States is either carried to Europe by a 
courier or hand carried to a New York bank or money exchange where it is forwarded 
to an account in a Swiss bank. There, the money is transferred to the account of the 
heroin supplier. 
Former U.S. Atty. Robert Morganthau cited a recent heroin case where a part 
of the payoff for smuggling heroin, $950,000, was sent to the Swiss bank account of a 
Panamanian corporation with offices in Geneva. 
For organized crime, the secret foreign bank accounts are used to conceal the 
profits of crime and to facilitate carrying out such international crimes as narcotics 
trafficking, smuggling, black market currency operations in Southeast Asia and ille-
gal trading in gold. 
Eugene T. Rossides, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and 
Operations, says that there's strong evidence of a substantial flow of funds from U.S. 
racketeers, particularly those associated with gambling to certain foreign banks. 
"Some of the funds," he said recently, "appear to have been brought back into 
the U.S. under the guise of loans from foreign sources. This may be providing a 
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organized crime uses secret accounts for revenues generated by 
gambling operations, loan sharking, prostitution, untaxed liquor, 160 
skimmed profits from Las Vegas casinos, 161 and bribes and kick-
backs. 162 The illicit funds are then used for financing new ventures 
and the takeover of legitimate businesses. 163 More importantly, or-
ganized crime owns some of the foreign banks which use the secrecy 
laws to shield illegal activities. 164 By virtue of the foreign bank se-
crecy laws and the former lack of U.S. record-keeping requirements 
on the import and export of currency, organized crime has found a 
safe repository for its money, anonymity for itself and a legitimate 
place from which to finance future operations. The secrecy of the 
accounts frustrates . any attempts at discovering the identity of the 
persons owning the accounts even after the money has been traced. 
The Bank Secrecy Act, in conjunction with the Treaty, should 
substantially interfere with organized crime's use of Switzerland as 
the repository for its funds. The only exception to the application 
of the Treaty is identifying offenses. Irrespective of what other of-
substantial source of funds for investment by the criminal elements in legitimate 
business in the United States." 
159. Hearings #1, supra note 134, at 25. In one case heroin was smuggled into the 
United States in airplane lavatories while payment was transferred into secret European bank 
accounts by couriers from other secret accounts. 
160. See note 158 supra at 16955. 
161. Id. at 16952, 16955. 
162. See U.S. v. Ohio Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 368 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1966) for 
kickbacks; U.S. v. Armantrout, 411 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1969) for a case involving consumer 
frauds; U.S. v. Cohen, 37 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) for a case involving fraudulent financial 
statements - these were not organized crime cases, however. 
163. See note 158 supra ·at 16955-56. Organized crime has also used foreign bank ac-
counts for the illegal trading of gold, in all types of public and business activities, including 
the military in Vietnam. 
164. Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 8, at 246. Statement by Robert Morgan-
thau: 
A startling development of recent years has been a significant change in the 
identity and ownership of foreign banks. Today numerous banks in Switzerland and 
the Bahamas are owned and controlled not only by Americans, but in some cases by 
American hoodlums closely linked to loansharking, gambling rackets, and other ille-
gal activities. Such a bank does not need a large working capital to be a useful 
element of an illegal business. Its function is not to provide funds for the business as 
much as to provide an unreachable depository for illegal profits. Such a bank might 
even not keep its accumulated funds on deposit, but might well redeposit them in a 
more substantial foreign bank or even a U.S. bank. An American criminal who is not 
content simply to accumulate wealth in a foreign bank can easily and safely cause 
the bank to "lend" it back to him. These devices and many others are all at the 
disposal of this growing number of "foreign" banks controlled or connected with the 
Americans and the American underworld. 
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fense is suspected of being committed, once a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity has been shown, the Swiss will assist the United 
States in prosecuting organized crime and its members. The Treaty 
will be superior to other Swiss law, since a treaty or convention 
becomes federal law and in Switzerland federal law is superior to 
cantonal law. 165 
V. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The Bank Secrecy Act and the Swiss Treaty were passed as 
remedial legislation intended to prevent the use of foreign bank 
accounts as repositories for illegally acquired funds. Although some 
covert activities will be affected by these measures, they are by no 
means a complete solution to the problem. 
In the area of income tax evasion, the recording requirements 
of Title I will prevent the use of U.S. financial institutions as a 
device through which funds can be channeled into foreign bank 
accounts. Title II of the Act, however, will probably be unenforce-
able. The cost of preventing the physical transfer of funds into or 
out of the country will prevent this section of the Act from acting 
as an effective deterrent to illegal activity. 
The Swiss Treaty will serve to limit income tax evasion only 
when it can be shown that there is a reasonable suspicion that the 
Bank Secrecy Act has been violated. The Swiss will probably not 
render any assistance in tax matters unless either organized crime 
is involved or there is a violation of the Double Taxation Conven-
tion. 
Neither the Bank Secrecy Act nor the Swiss Treaty will assist 
in the prosecution of those taxpayers who use foreign bank accounts 
to generate false deductions through non-existent business transac-
tions. Finally, in the case of Americans whose incomes are sent 
directly to foreign bank accounts, the Bank Secrecy Act will only 
be helpful if that income had been sent from the U.S. mainland. An 
effective way for the Government to deal with the problem of false 
deductions would be for the Internal Revenue Service to disallow 
any deductions which are generated in foreign nations unless the 
taxpayer expressly gives the Internal Revenue Service permission to 
investigate his accounts. This would circumvent the problem that 
exists with respect to nations which allow the maintenance of secret 
bank accounts. 
165. See note 92 supra. 
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Title III of the Act does not adequately deal with security prob-
lems. While the Title does extend liability for the violation of mar-
gin requirements to the borrower, enforcement of this provision will 
prove difficult. The U.S. Government has no way of identifying the 
actual purchaser of securities when foreign banks act as an interme-
diary in the transaction. The U.S. broker who has sold the securities 
to the foreign bank cannot ascertain the identity of the person for 
whom the foreign bank has purchased the stock. 
All foreign banks and investors who purchase stock should be 
required to give the S.E.C. a detailed list of any beneficial or legal 
owner of the purchased stock. Violators of this provision must be 
punished by severe criminal and civil sanctions. Furthermore, all 
foreign purchasers should be required to sign a waiver of foreign 
bank secrecy laws with respect to their transaction in the event that 
a reasonable suspicion of margin violation occurs. It would also be 
beneficial to sign treaties with other nations allowing the United 
States access to any foreign bank account when there is a reasonable 
suspicion that the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 or 1934 
have been violated. In addition, when foreign investors seek to sell 
large blocks of stocks and securities, the S.E.C. should be notified 
in an effort to prevent stolen stocks and securities from being sold 
through foreign accounts. 
The Swiss Treaty is an effective device to combat organized 
crime. Since under its terms any crime, other than military offenses, 
will elicit the full cooperation of the Swiss government, this section 
of the Treaty would be an ideal model to use in negotiating similar 
treaties with other foreign bank secrecy nations. 
In summary, the Bank Secrecy Act, Title III of Public Law 91-
508, and the Swiss Treaty are the first step in the drive to end 
foreign bank secrecy. However, further development in this area is 
needed before the problems of secret foreign bank accounts will be 
completely remedied. 
Milton Steven Blaut 
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